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I. INTRODUCTION
In July 1983 a divided United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Barnes' held that
defense counsel assigned to prosecute an appeal from a criminal conviction does not
have, per se, a constitutional duty to raise all nonfrivolous issues requested by the
defendant. In the words of the majority, presented in an opinion written by Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger, such a rule would "seriously [undermine] the ability of
counsel to present the client's case in accord with counsel's professional evalua-
tion." 2 By relying upon considerations of appellate advocacy and the lawyer's
professional judgment for the foundation of its opinion, the majority raised several
constitutional questions, but left them unaddressed.
This Article will address the following questions: First, is the decision in Jones
v. Barnes consonant with prior Supreme Court pronouncements on the breadth and
function of the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel and of the
fourteenth amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection? Second, if
not, what constitutional duty should be placed upon appointed counsel in order to
gain consistency with the principles recognized in those prior decisions?
II. A HISTORY OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
The question of the duty of appointed counsel to raise on appeal nonfrivolous
issues3 pressed by the client arose under the broader rubric of the effective assistance
of counsel. At some point, failure of counsel to raise meritorious issues on appeal
constitutes failure to provide effective counsel. 4 To place into context the issue from
Jones v. Barnes-the duty of appointed counsel to raise on appeal nonfrivolous issues
requested by the client-it is important to trace the development of the right to the
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution, particularly as it pertains to indigent defendants.
A. The Right to the Assistance of Counsel as a Fundamental Right
In 1932 the Supreme Court decided Powell v. Alabama,5 a capital case in which
* Associate, Lane, Alton &Horst, Columbus, Ohio. B.A., 1981, Wittenberg Univ.;J.D., 1984, Ohio State Univ.
1. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
2. Id. at 751.
3. For purposes of this Article, nonfrivolous issues are those legal points arguable on their merits. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 37-41; see also Fischer & Keeley, The Duty to Raise Issues Requested by
the Client, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 29, 1983, at 16, col. 1.
5. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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counsel for the defendants was not appointed until the morning of the trial. The
defendants were convicted of rape and sentenced to death. 6 The Court, reversing the
convictions, found that the defendants' fourteenth amendment rights of due process
had been violated because they had not had sufficient time to work with counsel to
prepare a defense. 7
Though the Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama was based upon the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, rather than upon the sixth amendment
right to the assistance of counsel, the case mandated the appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants, at least in capital cases, to insure the overall fairness of the trial.8
That the Court appreciated the position of laypersons in complicated legal matters is
evident from this often-quoted language of the opinion:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue and otherwise inadmissi-
ble. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him.9
Six years later, the Court decided Johnson v. Zerbst.'0 In that case, a habeas
corpus action, the petitioner was serving a sentence for possessing and uttering
counterfeit money. At arraignment before trial, the petitioner pleaded not guilty,
stated that he had no lawyer, and, in response to an inquiry by the trial court, said that
he was ready for trial." The petitioner was then tried, convicted, and sentenced-
without the assistance of counsel.12 The Court, relying upon the sixth amendment
right to assistance of counsel, held that a federal court "could not deprive an accused
of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel."'13 Such waiver
must be intelligent and competent, "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege."14
6. Id. at 49-50.
7. Id. at 71. The holding in Powell v. Alabama is limited to "capital cases, where the defendant is unable to
employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeblemindedness,
illiteracy or the like. ... Id.
8. Id.; Levine, Toward Competent Counsel, 13 RtrrEs L.J. 227, 229 (1982).
9. 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (emphasis added).
10. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
11. Id. at 460.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 463.
14. Id. at 464. "The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must
depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused." Id.
The Court, since Johnson v. Zerbst, has addressed the question of what constitutes an intelligent, competent waiver
of the right to counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States er rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)) ("he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,
so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open'). Discussing
whether Faretta himself had waived his right to counsel, the Court noted: "weeks before trial, Faretta clearly and
unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and did not want counsel. The record
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The historic opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright 5 stated that the sixth amendment
right to the assistance of counsel is fundamental to a fair trial1 6 through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. This bound the states to recognize the
right of felony defendants to counsel. 17
In 1972 the right to the appointment of counsel was expanded to reach certain
non-felony indigent defendants by Argersinger v. Hamlin.1 8 The Supreme Court held
that no criminal defendants could be deprived of their liberty, even those involved in
prosecution for a petty offense, unless they were represented by counsel at trial.19 The
Court stated that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony,
unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."2 0 The reasoning of the Court in
Argersinger reflects the "guiding hand" principle set forth in Powell v. Alabama.21
Recognizing that even misdemeanor or petty offense prosecutions may involve
complicated issues that require the attention of trained counsel, the Court noted (with
regard to the decision of whether or not to plead guilty), "counsel is needed so that
the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the
prospect of going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the
prosecution.'"22
B. The Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel
1. At Trial
The logical corollary23 to the development of the right to counsel was the
development of the right to the effective assistance of counsel: "The Constitution's
guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appoint-
ment." ' 24 Indeed, in McMann v. Richardson25 in 1970, the Supreme Court noted that
"[i]t has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel." 26 In McMann, the defendants were advised by counsel to
plead guilty to state felonies. Counsel's advice to the defendants was apparently
based upon counsel's belief that confessions given by the defendants would be
admissible in evidence at trial, even though the defendants claimed that the
affirmatively shows that Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his
informed free will." Id.
15. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16. See supra text accompanying note 7.
17. 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963).
18. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
19. Id. at 33. A petty offense is, according to the Court, an offense punishable by imprisonment for less than six
months. Id.
20. Id. at 37.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
22. 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
23. Levine, supra note 8, at 231.
24. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); see also Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
25. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
26. Id. at 771 n.14.
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confessions were coerced. 27 The Court decided that defendants' sixth amendment
rights had not been violated because the advice rendered by counsel was "within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 28 Reiterating the
importance of effective counsel in securing the accused's sixth amendment rights, the
Court noted that "if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its
purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel .... 29
In 1984 the Court set forth the proper standard for attorney performance in
Strickland v. Washington.30 David Leroy Washington pleaded guilty to numerous
charges, including three capital murder charges, and was sentenced to death by a
Florida trial judge following a sentencing hearing. 31
Washington sought collateral relief in state court, and later sought a writ of
habeas corpus in the federal courts, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel at the
sentencing proceeding. 32 Following reversal of Washington's conviction by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 33 the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider the standards by which to judge a contention that
the Constitution requires that a criminal judgment be overturned because of the
ineffective assistance of counsel. 34
Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that a defendant
claiming that counsel's assistance was so ineffective as to require reversal of a
conviction must demonstrate two things: that counsel's performance fell below the
objective standard of "reasonably effective assistance under all the circumstances;" 35
27. Id. at 761-64 (1970).
28. Id. at 770-71. The United States Court of Appeals relied upon this language to fashion "reasonable
competence" and community standards tests for cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Under the "reasonableness" standard, the two predominant tests are whether counsel's actions are those of a
"reasonable attorney" or whether counsel's actions meet "community standards." The First, Third, Fourth, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits use the community standards test. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 631 F.2d 198, 200 (3d Cir.
1980); United States v. Zazzara, 626 F.2d 135, 138 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st
Cir. 1978); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979);
Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Easter,
539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736-37
(3d Cir. 1970).
The District of Columbia, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits follow the reasonably competent attorney standard. See,
e.g., Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980); United States v. Goodwin, 531
F.2d 347, 348 (6th Cir. 1976); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. DeCoster,
487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 877 (1961).
For a discussion of these standards, see generally Conflitti, A New Focus on Prejudice in Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Cases: The Assertion of Rights Standard, 21 Asteg. Cus. L. Rav. 29 (1983); Levine, supra note S.
29. 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
30. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
31. Id. at 672-75.
32. Id. at 675-81.
33. 679 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1982).
34. 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). It was noted that, with the exception of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980),
which involved a claim that counsel's assistance was ineffective because of a conflict of interest, the Court had never
directly addressed a claim of "actual" ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 683 (1984).
35. 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). The Court recognized that this standard had been adopted by all federal courts of
appeals. See, e.g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1983).
The Court instructed reviewing courts to "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy."' 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
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and that counsel's ineffective assistance prejudiced the defense, that is, that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. 36
2. On Appeal
In Evitts v. Lucey, 37 the United States Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the effective
assistance of counsel on the first appeal as of right. 38 Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, noted:
Respondent's claim arises at the intersection of two lines of cases. In one line, we have
held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal appellant pursuing a first
appeal as of right certain minimum safeguards necessary to make that appeal 'adequate
and effective,' see Griffin v. Illinois; among those safeguards is the right to counsel, see
Douglas v. California. In the second line, we have held that the trial-level right to
counsel, created by the Sixth Amendment and applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Gideon v. Wainwright, comprehends the right to the effective assistance
of counsel. See Cuyler v. Sullivan.39
The Court held that these two lines of cases were dispositive of Lucey's claim
that there existed a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 40 The Court
declined to decide the content of appropriate standards for judging claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, as it was not disputed that the assistance of
appellant's counsel was ineffective. 41
I. THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND APPEALS OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
BY INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
In Griffin v. Illinois,42 the Supreme Court held that a state was prohibited by
notions of due process and equal protection from denying access to appellate review
in a manner that discriminated against convicted defendants because of their
poverty. 43 Illinois law provided for an appeal as of right in criminal cases, but the
defendants in Griffin v. Illinois could not afford to purchase the trial transcripts
36. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Prejudice to the defense is presumed in certain situations, such as actual or
constructive denial of assistance of counsel; state interference with counsel's performance; or conflict of interest on
counsel's part. Id. at 692.
In the context of the"actual ineffectiveness" claim, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice by showing"that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. at 694.
37. 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985).
38. Id. at 836. The Court's decision in Evitts v. Lucey came a year and a half after Jones v. Barnes. Interestingly,
the Evins Court's characterization of the basis for its decision in Jones v. Barnes was more clear than that given in the
opinion itself: "In Jones, the appellate attorney had failed to raise every issue requested by the criminal defendant. This
Court rejected the claim, not because there was no right to effective assistance of appellate counsel, but because counsel's
conduct in fact served the goal of 'vigorous and effective advocacy.' The Court's reasoning would have been entirely
superfluous if there were no right to effective assistance of counsel in the first place." Id. at 836 n.8 (citations omitted);
see also infra text accompanying notes 42-49.
39. 105 S. Ct. 830, 834 (1985) (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 836.
41. Id. at 833.
42. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
43. Id. at 19.
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required for use on appeal of their convictions.44 The Court stated, "There can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants
who have money enough to buy transcripts." 4 5
Seven years later, the Court affirmed this reasoning and expanded the reach of
Griffin v. Illinois in Douglas v. California.4 6 In that case, a California intermediate
appellate court denied appointment of counsel for purposes of appeal to indigent
defendants. Consequently, the appeal was heard without the assistance of counsel,
and the defendants' convictions were upheld. 47 In granting the petition for writ of
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that when the merits of an indigent
defendant's first appeal as of right are decided without the assistance of counsel in a
state criminal case, there has been a violation of the defendant's fourteenth
amendment rights of due process and equal protection.4 The Court, echoing the
reasoning set forth seven years earlier in Griffin v. Illinois, stated:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the 14th Amendment where the rich man, who
appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research
of the law, and marshalling of arguments in his behalf, while the indigent, already
burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift
for himself. 49
As the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Evitts v. Lucey50 in 1985,
the cases recognizing the right to counsel on a first appeal as of right (Griffin v. Illinois,
Douglas v. California), and those recognizing that the right to counsel at trial includes
a right to effective assistance of counsel, (Avery v. Alabama, McMann v. Richardson,
Strickland v. Washington), compelled recognition of the principle that the due process
and equal protection guarantees extend to indigent defendants the right to the effective
assistance of counsel on an equal basis with defendants employing their own counsel
at both the trial and appeal as of right. 5t It is under this broad rubric that the question
answered by Jones v. Barnes arose:52 Does defense counsel assigned to prosecute an
44. Id. at 13. The Court did not recognize a constitutional right to appeal. "It is true that a State is not required
by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. . . . But that is not to say that
a State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account
of their poverty." Id. at 18.
45. Id. at 19.
46. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
47. Id. at 354.
48. Id. at 356.
49. Id. at 357-58.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
51. 105 S. Ct. 830, 836 (1985). The principles set forth in the broad language of Griffn v. Illinois and Douglas
v. California have been limited by the Court. In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court refused to extend
Douglas v. California to require counsel for second, discretionary appeals. See Herman & Thompson, Scott v. Illinois
and the Right to Counsel: A Decision In Search of A Doctrine?, 17 AmER. Cium. L. REv. 71, 109 (1979). The Court in
Ross v. Moffitt concluded that, at the discretionary appeal stage, the indigent defendant could have meaningful review
without counsel. Herman & Thompson, supra, at 109. The transcript, the brief prepared by counsel for the first appeal
as of right, and the opinion of the first level court of appeals, together with whatever else the pro se defendant can add,
make meaningful review possible without the presence of counsel. Id.
52. Evitts v. Lucey was decided January 21, 1985. Thus, that decision was not binding on the Court in Jones v.
Barnes. The point is that the precedent relied upon by the Court in reaching its decision in Evitts v. Lucey was solidly in
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appeal from a criminal conviction have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous
issue requested by the defendant?
IV. Jones v. Barnes
A. The Facts
In 1976 David Barnes was charged with first and second-degree robbery,
second-degree assault, and third-degree larceny following the beating and robbing of
one Richard Butts in Brooklyn, New York.5 3 Butts' testimony and identification of
Barnes at trial was the heart of the prosecution's case.54 On cross-examination,
defense counsel asked Butts if he had ever received psychiatric treatment, but did not
make an offer of proof on the substance or relevance of the question after the trial
judge had instructed Butts not to answer.55 Barnes was convicted by a jury of first and
second-degree robbery and second-degree assault.5 6
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second
Department, assigned Michael Melinger to represent Barnes on appeal.57 Barnes sent
a letter to Melinger which detailed several claims that he felt should be raised on
appeal.5 8 Barnes included with his letter a copy of the pro se brief he had written.5 9
Melinger's letter in response rejected most of these claims, explaining to Barnes
that they would not be helpful in winning a new trial or that they could not be raised
on appeal because they were not based on evidence in the record. 60 Melinger listed
several claims he was considering for inclusion in his brief, and asked for Barnes'
"reflections and suggestions" regarding these.61 The record does not reveal a
response by Barnes to this letter. 62
Melinger's brief to the Appellate Division concentrated on three of the seven
claims he had suggested in his letter to Barnes. 63 Melinger also submitted Barnes' pro
place at the time Jones v. Barnes was decided in July 1983. As Justice Brennan pointed out, writing for the majority in
Evits v. Lucey:
Moreover, Jones v. Barnes adjudicated a similar claim "of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel." In
Jones, the appellate attorney had failed to raise every issue requested by the criminal defendant. This Court
rejected the claim, not because there was no right to effective assistance of appellate counsel, but because
counsel's conduct in fact served the goal of "vigorous and effective advocacy." The Court's reasoning would
have been entirely superfluous if there were no right to effective assistance of counsel in the first place.
105 S. Ct. 830, 836 n.8 (1985) (citations omitted).
53. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 747 (1983).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. These included claims that Butts' identification testimony should have been suppressed; that the trial judge
improperly excluded psychiatric evidence; and that Barnes' trial counsel was ineffective. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 747-48.
61. Id. at 748.
62. Id.
63. Id. The points raised were improper exclusion of psychiatric evidence, failure to suppress Butts' identification
testimony, and improper cross-examination of Barnes by the trial judge. Id.
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se brief, and Barnes later filed two more pro se briefs raising three more of the points
Melinger had identified in his letter.64
At oral argument, Melinger argued the three points raised in his own brief, but
not the arguments presented by Barnes in the pro se briefs.65 In May 1978 the
Appellate Division affirmed Barnes' conviction. 66
In August 1978 Barnes filed, pro se, a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, asserting five
claims of error, including ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 67 This petition was
dismissed by the district court. 68 On appeal, the dismissal was affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 69 The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 70
In 1980 Barnes tried again. He filed three challenges to his conviction in the
New York state court system; all were denied.71 On March 31, 1980, Barnes filed a
petition in the New York Court of Appeals for reconsideration of denial of leave to
appeal, claiming for the first time that his appointed appellate counsel, Melinger, had
provided ineffective assistance. 72
Barnes then returned to the federal courts, filing in district court a petition for
writ of habeas corpus based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. 73 The district court dismissed Barnes' petition, holding that there appeared
in the record no support for a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The
court stated, "It is not required that an attorney argue every conceivable issue on
appeal, especially when some may be without merit. Indeed, it is his professional
duty to choose among potential issues, according to his judgment as to their merit and
his tactical approach.' 4
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 75 holding that when "the
appellant requests that [his attorney] raise additional colorable points [on appeal],
counsel must argue the additional points to the full extent of his professional
ability. "76 In so holding, the Court of Appeals relied upon Anders v. California,77 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that an appointed attorney may not
withdraw from the representation of a defendant in a nonfrivolous appeal. 78
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Ineffectiveness of trial counsel was one of the issues that Barnes had requested that Melinger raise before
the Appellate Division. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
68. Id.
69. Barnes v. Jones, 607 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1979).
70. Barnes v. Jones, 444 U.S. 853 (1979).
71. 463 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1983).
72. New York v. Barnes, 49 N.Y.2d 1001 (1980).
73. 463 U.S. 745, 749 (1983).
74. Id. It does not appear, from this language, that the district court accorded much significance to the fact that
Barnes had requested (and possibly insisted) that certain issues be raised; indeed, the district court spoke in terms of"every
conceivable issue." Id.
75. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1981).
76. Id. at 433.
77. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
78. Id. at 744.
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The issue in Anders v. California was the extent of the duty of a court-appointed
appellate counsel to prosecute a first appeal from a criminal conviction, after the
attorney has determined there is no merit to the indigent's appeal.79 Anders sought
appeal from a felony conviction, and requested appointment of counsel. Appointed
counsel, after studying the record and consulting with Anders, concluded that there
was no merit to the appeal and so advised the California District Court of Appeals.80
Anders requested that another attorney be appointed to prosecute the appeal; when the
request was denied, petitioner proceeded pro se. The conviction was unanimously
affirmed. 8'
Petitioner filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of
Appeals, asserting that the court's refusal to appoint counsel was a deprivation of his
right to counsel. 82 Upon denial of the application, petitioner filed for writ of habeas
corpus with the Supreme Court of California, which petition was denied. 83
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment, finding that
California's action did not "comport with fair procedure, and lack[ed] that equality
that is required by the Fourteenth Amendment." 84 Acknowledging its continuing
adherence to the equal protection principles set forth in Griffin v. Illinois85 ("where
it was held that equal justice was not afforded an indigent appellant where the nature
of the review 'depends on the amount of money he has" 8 6), and to the sixth
amendment principles set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright87 ("in our adversary system
of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him"8 8), the Court
decided that appointed counsel's bare "no-merit" conclusion did not afford Anders
his right to full appellate review. 89
In order to satisfy constitutional requirements, the Court held, if counsel
conscientiously decides that the appeal is wholly frivolous, he should advise the court
and request permission to withdraw. 9° Counsel must furnish the court and the
indigent with a brief setting forth anything in the record that might arguably support
the appeal. If after full review the court finds any legal points arguable, it must afford
the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal. 9'
This procedure, said the Court, echoing Griffin v. Illinois, "will assure
penniless defendants the same rights and opportunities on appeal-as nearly as is
practicable-as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar situation but who
79. Id. at 739.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 740.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 741.
84. Id.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
86. 386 U.S. 738, 741 (1967).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
88. 386 U.S. 738, 742 (1967).
89. Id. at 744.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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are able to afford the retention of private counsel.' '92
The Court of Appeals in Barnes v. Jones reasoned that if Anders v. California
prohibited counsel from withdrawing from a nonfrivolous appeal, it also prohibited
counsel from withdrawing from raising a nonfrivolous issue on appeal:
[A]ppointed counsel's unwillingness to present particular arguments at appellant's request
functions not only to abridge defendant's right to counsel on appeal, but also to limit the
defendant's constitutional right to equal access to the appellate process . . .93
B. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court was thus faced with this question: Does
defense counsel assigned to prosecute an appeal from a criminal conviction have a
constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant, his
client? The majority answered this question in the negative. 94
Chief Justice Burger acknowledged, in the beginning of a brief opinion, that an
accused defendant has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions
regarding the case (for example, whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, or to testify
in his or her own behalf), 95 and that a defendant may, as a general matter, act as an
advocate on his or her own behalf.96 However, the majority held that indigent
defendants do not have a right to compel appointed counsel to raise nonfrivolous
issues requested by them "if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides
not to present these points. " 97
The crux of the majority opinion is the superior ability of counsel to make a
professional judgment regarding the conduct of an effective appeal. The Court
discussed the most effective tack for presenting an argument to an appellate court:
"Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance
of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if
possible, or at most on a few key issues." 98 The Court apparently concluded that the
appointed lawyers best meet their obligations to their clients by bringing to bear all
their knowledge, skill, and experience to win reversal of a conviction. Indeed, the
Court concluded that Barnes' counsel, Melinger, by using his professional judgment
to select the issues he deemed to be the strongest for appeal, supported his client's
appeal "to the best of his ability." 99
92. Id. at 745.
93. 665 F.2d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 1981).
94. 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983).
95. Id. at 751 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
96. 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).
97. 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
98. Id. at 751-52. The Court discussed several articles and treatises advancing the art of appellate advocacy. See
R. SERN, APa-.Xss PtRcnc iN mTE Uarrs STArS (1981); Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A.J. 895 (1940);
Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25 TE.sNtm L.Q. 115 (1951); see generally Godbold, Twenty
Pages and Twenty Minutes-Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 Sw. L.J. 801 (1976).
99. 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983) (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)).
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V. Jones v. Barnes: AN ANALYSIS
The reasoning of the majority in Jones v. Barnes is persuasive. The right to the
assistance of counsel is itself a recognition of the fact that those trained and
experienced in the practice of law are best qualified to secure the rights guaranteed
to individuals by the Constitution and the laws-their guidance is necessary to
achieve the correct or desired result. In recognizing that the fourteenth amendment
due process and equal protection clauses mandate the appointment of counsel for
indigent criminal defendants, 100 the Court acknowledged that those unable to pay for
it are entitled, as a matter of law, to the benefits of the professional ability of counsel
on par with those defendants able to employ counsel.
If it is recognized that as a general matter criminal defendants are unable to
present their own defenses as effectively as trained counsel, and thus that defendants
must be entitled to the assistance of counsel in preparing their defenses, it follows
logically that counsel, because of superior ability, should decide what issues should
be presented on appeal. Stated more specifically, if by requiring the appointment of
counsel for indigent defendants' 0 ' one intends to protect them from their own lack of
legal expertise, it would then not be sensible to allow them to decide, against the
advice of counsel, which issues should be raised on appeal. Since it is important to
provide indigent defendants with the best possible representation, appointed counsel
should not be placed under the restrictions of an appellate strategy dictated by the
untrained, legally inexperienced defendant.
This is, in effect, the implicit mainstem of the majority's opinion in Jones v.
Barnes. Such an argument, that an indigent defendant is more likely to be given the
best representation by allowing appointed counsel to decide which issues to press, has
both strength and appeal. In the words of the majority,
[T]he role of the advocate "requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of his
ability." Here the appointed counsel did just that. For judges to second-guess reasonable
professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise every "colorable"
claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective
advocacy. 102
However logically and practically appealing the majority's reasoning may be,
the Court's reliance upon considerations of appellate advocacy and strategy to answer
a question with obvious constitutional ramifications is unsettling. The opinion fails to
address the equal protection and due process questions inherent in the issue before the
Court.
A. Equal Protection
The Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois10 3 and Douglas v. California0 4 held
100. See supra text accompanying note 8.
101. This notion includes the caveat that the defendant may, knowingly and intelligently, waive appointment of
counsel. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
102. 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983) (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (citation omitted)).
103. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
104. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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that states cannot discriminate against indigent defendants in giving access to
appellate review: "[Tihere can be no equal justice where the kind of appeal a man
enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has.' 11 0 5 In Jones v. Barnes, the Court
compelled an indigent defendant to accept the professional judgment of counsel
concerning which nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal. A "paying" accused is
under no such compulsion. The "paying" accused has, theoretically, the financial
power to direct his or her attorney to conduct the appeal according to the defendants'
wishes.' 0 6 Denying the indigent defendant similar control is not consistent with the
constitutional principles set forth in Griffin v. Illinois and Douglas v. California.10 7
Clearly the import of these decisions is that such differential treatment of indigent
defendants vis-h-vis defendants employing their counsel is not constitutionally
permissible. The Court in Jones v. Barnes, by completely avoiding the equal
protection issue, does more than simply raise questions about the scope and meaning
of its decisions in Griffin v. Illinois and Douglas v. California. Indeed, the result in
Jones v. Barnes, leaving the indigent defendant (unlike the "paying" accused),
without the right to direct counsel to raise issues on appeal, flies in the face of the
principle set forth in Griffin v. Illinois and echoed in Douglas v. California: "[T]here
can be no equal justice where the kind of appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount
of money he has."' 10 8
B. Fundamental Decisions versus Matters of Strategy
As stated earlier, in 1977 the Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Sykes noted that
criminal defendants have the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental
decisions regarding their cases. 109 In previous cases, these have been identified as
whether to plead guilty,' 10 whether to waive a jury,' whether to testify in one's own
behalf, 112 and whether to take an appeal. 113 Other decisions, generally classified as
matters of "trial strategy," are said to be the sole province of counsel.11 4
Without discussion, the Court in Jones v. Barnes apparently decided that the
question of which nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal is purely a matter of appellate
strategy. This proposition is at least debatable, particularly in view of the reasons
asserted for allocating to counsel decisions of strategy. As stated in Wainwright v.
Sykes:
Once counsel is appointed, the day-to-day conduct of the defense rests with the attorney.
He, not the client... has responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which
witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop .... The trial process simply
105. Id. at 355 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
106. Whether or not the defendant uses this power should not, for constitutional purposes, concern us here.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
108. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
109. See supra text accompanying note 95.
110. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966).
111. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
112. Id.
113. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439-40 (1963).
114. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 433, 451 (1965).
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does not permit the type of frequent and protracted interruptions which would be
necessary if it were required that clients give knowing and intelligent approval to each of
the myriad tactical decisions as a trial proceeds." 5
It makes sense, obviously, to relegate decisions of this kind to counsel. These
decisions clearly are matters of pure strategy, decisions which must often be made in
a matter of minutes or seconds in the course of a trial.t1 6 The decision of which
nonfrivolous issue to raise on appeal is, however, a different kind of decision. Its
relegation to counsel is not supported by the considerations set forth above.
First, the decision of which issues to press on appeal is a decision which can be,
and should be, made with deliberation, in the course of deciding whether to appeal
at all. 117 Second, by its very nature, it is the kind of decision that the defendant should
be involved in, since it concerns the very substance of the appeal. Surely this is a
decision fundamental to the case, in the same way that the decisions whether to
appeal, plead guilty, or waive a jury have been deemed fundamental.1 8
C. Practical Considerations
In addition to the constitutional issues set forth in the above sections, there are
practical, nonconstitutional considerations left unaddressed by the majority in Jones
v. Barnes. First, the Court seems to assume that a well-counseled defendant,
appealing a criminal conviction (and presumably trying to avoid imprisonment or a
fine), would reject counsel's advice as to the most effective means of pursuing the
appeal, and insist, over counsel's objections, on having the case presented according
to the defendant's wishes." 9 Common sense dictates that the larger number of
defendants would heed counsel's advice (if they ever challenged it to begin with), and
prosecution of the appeal would proceed according to counsel's professional
evaluation. As Justice Brennan stated in dissent:
It should take little or no persuasion to get a wise client to understand that, if staying out
of prison is what he values most, he should encourage his lawyer to raise only his two or
three best arguments on appeal, and he should defer to his lawyer's advice as to which are
the best arguments. The Constitution, however, does not require clients to be wise, and
other policies should be weighed in the balance as well.120
Second, for that small group of well-counseled clients that chooses to disregard
counsel's advice and contrarily insists upon the presentation of other issues, the
forcing upon them of counsel's judgment can only serve to intensify an already
existing distrust of the criminal justice system.12' If the client is prevented from
115. 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, C.I., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
116. 463 U.S. 745, 760 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 110-14.
119. The Court noted its assumption that the Court of Appeals majority correctly concluded that David Barnes
insisted that counsel raise the issues he requested, and did not simply accept counsel's decision not to press those issues.
463 U.S. 745, 750 n.4 (1983).
120. 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 762. See also Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 28 (1973); see
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adding meaningful input into the conduct of the appeal, it is unlikely that the client
will believe that counsel, chosen and paid by the very same prosecuting government,
is acting in the client's best interests. As the Supreme Court noted in Faretta v.
California,122 with regard to the right of accused defendants to represent themselves
at trial: "To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law
contrives against him."' 12 3
D. Whose Appeal Is It, Anyway?
The most disturbing aspect of the opinion in Jones v. Barnes is the majority's
reliance upon considerations of effective appellate advocacy, rather than upon
constitutional considerations, as the basis for its decision. Is the appeal merely a
forum for counsel to exhibit skill at selecting meritorious arguments and in building
an effective and artful case? Or is the appeal a forum for defendants to present their
cases with the aid of one trained in law and procedure-to give defendants their "day
in court"? These questions give rise to both constitutional and policy issues.
The sixth amendment guarantees that in criminal prosecutions, those accused
shall have the right to the assistance of counsel for their defense.' 2 4 As Justice
Brennan noted in dissent in Jones v. Barnes,
[t]he import of words like "assistance" and "counsel" seems inconsistent with a regime
under which counsel appointed by the state to represent a criminal defendant can refuse
to raise issues with arguable merit on appeal when his client, after hearing his assessment
of the case and his advice, has directed him to raise them. 25
Though the majority in Jones v. Barnes does not explicitly define "assistance of
counsel," it is clear that its interpretation does not place emphasis upon the word
"assistance." Under the view of the majority, it appears that to the indigent
defendant, the guarantee of the right to the assistance of counsel becomes an
all-or-nothing proposition; if the indigent defendant chooses to be represented by
counsel for purposes of pursuing an appeal, all control over the substance of that
appeal is relinquished to counsel. Such a result is completely inconsistent with the
language used by the Court in Faretta v. California126 and McKaskle v. Wiggins. 2 7
The issue in Faretta v. California was whether the defendant in a state criminal
case had a sixth amendment right to proceed at trial without the assistance of counsel,
when he voluntarily and intelligently elected to do so.'2 8 In holding that the defendant
generally Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEo. L.J. 1015 (1981); Skolnick, Social Control and
the Adversary System, 11 J. Comvcr RFs. 52 (1967).
122. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
123. Id. at 834.
124. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
125. 463 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
127. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
128. 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). The Court in Faretta also stated the issue this way: "Whether a state may
constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants
to conduct his own defense." Id.
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could waive his right to the assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment, the
Court stated:
It [the counsel provision] speaks of the "assistance" of counsel, and an assistant,
however expert, is still an assistant. The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment
contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment,
shall be an aid to a willing defendant-not an organ of the State interposed between an
unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally.129
The import of this language, written only eight years before Jones v. Barnes was
decided, is to recognize the role of counsel as an aid to the defendant, an "assistant"
in the ordinary sense of the word. 130 It would appear that the role of an assistant, an
aid to the defendant, is inconsistent with the view of the majority, which seems to
allow counsel, despite his client's wishes, to dictate the conduct of the appeal.
The result in Jones v. Barnes is also inconsistent with language in McKaskle v.
Wiggins, a case which, like Jones v. Barnes, concerned the limits placed upon the
role of appointed counsel. In McKaskle v. Wiggins, the defendant in a state robbery
trial was permitted to appear pro se, but the trial court appointed standby counsel to
assist him. 13 1 Throughout the trial, the defendant changed his mind regarding the
standby counsel's role, agreeing to counsel's participation on some occasions, and
rejecting it on others.1 32 Following his conviction, the defendant appealed on the
ground that his standby counsel interfered with his presentation of his defense.1 33
After exhausting state review, the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in federal
court, claiming that standby counsel's conduct deprived him of his right to present his
own defense, as guaranteed by Faretta v. California.134 Finding that defendant's
rights had not been violated, the Court discussed the role of counsel: "The Counsel
Clause itself, which permits the accused 'to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense,' implies a right in the defendant to conduct his own defense, with assistance
at what, after all, is his, not counsel's trial. ' ' ' 3s The language used by the Court in
these decisions clearly contemplates that the role of appointed counsel is to aid the
defendant in making decisions that are the defendant's to make, not to make decisions
for the defendant.
The majority view is most unsettling because of the underlying thread running
through the Court's opinion. The opinion seems to define the sixth amendment issues
in terms of the duties of appointed counsel, rather than in terms of the rights of the
defendant. While it may be suggested that counsel's duties and defendant's rights are
simply two sides of the same coin-that each defines the scope of the other-it is
clear that the sixth amendment, which speaks in terms of the "accused," contem-
plates that the rights of the defendant be the yardstick by which the duties of counsel
129. Id. at 820 (emphasis added).
130. Assistant is defined as "one giving aid or support . . . one who assists: HELPER." Wnmk's TDrm
ImERNAalio.AL Dicno.ARY 132 (1981).
131. 465 U.S. 168, 170-71 (1984).
132. Id. at 172-73.
133. Id. at 173.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 174.
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are measured. As the Court stated in Faretta v. California, "[tihe right to defend is
given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense
fails." 136 Defining the counsel's duties without delineating the scope of the
defendant's personal rights results in a "different conception of the defense lawyer's
role-he need do nothing beyond what the State, not his client, considers most
important." 137
This is the crux of the issue. If the sixth amendment right to defend is given
directly to the accused, it is consistent with that right to say that the accused, not
counsel, has the ultimate authority to decide which nonfrivolous issues should be
raised on appeal. In dissent, Justice Brennan stated his belief that "the right to 'the
assistance of counsel' carries with it a right, personal to the defendant, to make that
decision, against the advice of counsel if he chooses.' 138
Surely, Faretta v. California, Anders v. California,139 Griffin v. Illinois ,14 and
the "guiding hand" language of the Court in Powell v. Alabama'4' describe the right
to the assistance of counsel in terms similar to those used by Justice Brennan and
quoted above. 142 These cases indicate that the Supreme Court has long considered the
sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel an individual right, personal to the
defendant and that the "function of counsel under the Sixth Amendment is to protect
the dignity and autonomy of a person on trial by assisting him in making choices that
are his to make, not to make choices for him . . . . ,143
The majority seems to assert that on the basis of what is known about effective
appellate advocacy, an indigent defendant is provided with better representation if
appointed counsel is allowed to bring to bear the full weight of his or her professional
judgment in selecting which nonfrivolous issues to present on appeal, regardless of
the defendant's wishes in the matter. Such a view is merely a smokescreen for
denying indigent defendants the full extent of their fourteenth amendment and sixth
amendment rights as described by the Court in Faretta v. California.144 Certainly,
full representation for indigent defendants is a goal under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments, but thefull effectuation of the defendant's rights-even if the defendant
should lose the appeal-is the greater good at stake.
"[A]Ithough the accused may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own
detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is
the lifeblood of the law." ' 145 If the lifeblood of our law, embodied by the
136. 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975) (emphasis added).
137. 463 U.S. 745, 764 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
139. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). To satisfy the Constitution, counsel must function as an advocate for the defendant as
opposed to a friend of the court. Id. at 744.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45, 105.
141. 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). See supra text accompanying note 9.
142. See supra text accompanying note 125.
143. 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29, 136-37.
145. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 758 (1983) (Brennan, I., dissenting) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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Constitution, is respect for the dignity of the individual, 146 then surely the right of
defendants to choose the issues by which they bring an appeal, with advice of
counsel, should be acknowledged. It is this right of the defendant which must prevail
over accepted tenets of effective appellate advocacy, even if the latter is viewed from
a practical perspective as being for the defendant's "own good." This issue serves
to remind, as much as any other, of our "legitimate interest in justice for its own
sake."1 47
The Supreme Court of the United States has, in Jones v. Barnes, avoided
answering constitutional questions inherent in this case. To decide an issue apparently
fraught with constitutional considerations on the basis of treatises (however scholarly)
advancing the art of appellate advocacy serves no one. Perhaps underlying the
decision are notions that indigent defendants, having received a "free" lawyer,
should be well-satisfied with the fact of appointment and should not interfere with
counsel's conduct of the appeal. Possibly, the Court was concerned with the effect the
Brennan view would have on the already overcrowded and slow-moving appellate
docket. Finally, perhaps the Court was considering the notion that most of the
convicted defendants, having once been proven guilty, have already had their day in
court. The above potential justifications for the majority's opinion are at best
speculations, for none of them were expressly addressed by the Court. One thing,
however, is certain: The constitutional issues avoided by the Court in Jones v. Barnes
must ultimately be addressed in the future.
VI. A PRoPOSL
Following the equal protection and sixth amendment principles set forth by the
Court in Griffin v. Illinois, Douglas v. California, and Faretta v. California,148 it
seems clear that the right of the indigent defendant to exercise ultimate authority in
deciding which nonfrivolous issues to present on appeal exists and should be
recognized by the Supreme Court.
The corresponding duty of appointed counsel, suggested by Justice Brennan in
dissent, 49 is to assess the merits of the nonfrivolous issues available for appeal and
present these to the defendant with advice as to the most effective tack, according to
counsel's professional opinion, to pursue on appeal. After having heard counsel's
professional evaluation and advice, if the client insists 5 0 that counsel raise issues
other than, or in addition to, those recommended by counsel, the attorney should be
constitutionally compelled to do so. 15 1
146. This proposition is supported, with regard to the sixth amendment, by the decisions in Faretta v. California,
Anders v. California, Griffin v. Illinois, and Powell v. Alabama. See supra text accompanying notes 139-43.
147. Bazelon, supra note 121, at 5.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 103-47.
149. 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. Clients should be informed of their right to make the ultimate decision regarding the issues to be raised on
appeal, if they wish to do so. If the client merely suggests other issues to be raised, or questions the judgment of counsel,
this could lead to a discussion between counsel and client; an opportunity for counsel to persuade the client to accept the
suggested course of action. If the client insists, however, counsel is under a duty to follow the client's direction.
151. Of course, counsel is under no duty to raise those issues which are frivolous (without merit). See supra
note 3.
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This approach is required by the equal protection principles recognized in Griffin
v. Illinois and Douglas v. California.1 5 2 If "there can be no equal justice where the
kind of appeal a man enjoys 'depends upon the amount of money he has, ' " t53
indigent defendants are constitutionally entitled to the power to compel their
appointed attorneys to raise issues on appeal-a power that "paying" defendants, at
least in theory, have.
Recognition of this duty is also consistent with the sixth amendment consider-
ations set forth by the Court in Faretta v. California and McKaskle v. Wiggins,' 54
which contemplate that the role of appointed counsel is to aid defendants in making
decisions that are theirs to make. These decisions recognize that counsel is appointed
in order to provide indigent defendants with the professional expertise necessary to
conduct their defense, at the same time emphasizing tiat "an assistant [counsel],
however expert is still an assistant ... an aid to a willing defendant."'155
Imposition of this duty upon counsel would, in operation, be similar to the
doctrine of informed consent in tort law. 156 Physicians, trained, skilled professionals,
are required to convey to their patients their professional evaluation and advice
regarding the patients' medical conditions. Patients thus gain both the benefit of
physicians' professional expertise and protection from their own lack of medical
education. The ultimate decision regarding treatment, however, belongs to the
patient. 157 The doctrine of informed consent in tort protects the interests of patients
in making their own decisions, while giving them access to the medical expertise and
advice necessary to make their decisions informed ones. The role of appointed
counsel, under the duty described, would function in the same manner. 158
In proposing that the duty of appointed counsel to raise nonfrivolous issues
requested by the client be recognized, the difficulties that could arise from its
application-for example, enforcement-must not be overlooked. Common sense
dictates, however, that this situation will not arise often; 159 thus, practical problems
152. See supra text accompanying notes 103-08.
153. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 126-35.
155. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975) (emphasis added).
156. The doctrine of informed consent is referred to in this Article for purposes of analogy only. For a
comprehensive discussion of this tort doctrine, see J. LUot.ss, Irossrrn CoNster (1978); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
157. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972):
The root premise is the concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that "[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body. . . .True consent to what
happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate
knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each. The average patient has little or no
understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for enlightenment
with which to reach an intelligent decision. From these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and
in turn the requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to make such a decision an informed
one.
id. at 780 (footnotes omitted).
158. This is not to suggest that the doctrine of informed consent is constitutionally mandated, or that the recognition
of the informed consent doctrine compels recognition of the duty of appointed counsel to raise on appeal nonfrivoloes
issues requested by the client. The analogy is offered only to demonstrate that imposition of this duty on appointed counsel
is feasible.
159. See supra text accompanying note 120.
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will be minimal. At the least, the difficulties are not likely to be greater than those
presented by the implementation of any important, constitutionally mandated
principle that is recognized by the Court. The lower federal courts would be put to the
task by giving the doctrine practical content.
VII. CONCLUSION
By deciding the question raised in Jones v. Barnes-whether appointed counsel
has a constitutional duty to raise on appeal nonfrivolous issues requested by the
defendant--on the basis of recognized principles of effective appellate advocacy, the
Supreme Court left unaddressed two issues of constitutional magnitude. These
important issues are the equal protection and due process rights of indigent defendants
prosecuting an appeal of a criminal conviction, and the role of appointed counsel
contemplated by the sixth amendment.
The result in Jones v. Barnes is that counsel assigned to prosecute an appeal of
a criminal conviction is under no constitutional duty to raise on appeal nonfrivolous
issues requested by their clients. This result is inconsistent with prior Supreme Court
pronouncements on the right of indigent defendants to equal access to the appellate
process tr° (as set forth in Griffin v. Illinois and Douglas v. California) and on the role
and function of appointed counsel under the sixth amendmentt6 l (as set forth in
Faretta v. California and recently in McKaskle v. Wiggins).
Douglas v. California states unequivocally, paraphrasing Griffin v. Illinois, that
"there can be no equal justice where the kind of appeal a man enjoys 'depends upon
the amount of money he has." ' 162 Faretta v. California and McKaskle v. Wiggins
both conclusively state that the role of appointed counsel is conceived, under the sixth
amendment, as an aid, or assistant, to the defendant presenting the case. As Justice
O'Connor stated in McKaskle v. Wiggins, "[t]he Counsel Clause itself, which
permits the accused 'to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence,' with
assistance at what, after all, is his, not counsel's trial."163
The result in Jones v. Barnes is inconsistent with the language and spirit of prior
Supreme Court decisions construing the guarantees of the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. Surely the rights of an indigent defendant can only be fully effectuated
through the Supreme Court's recognition of the defendant's ultimate authority to
direct appointed appellate counsel to raise certain nonfrivolous issues on appeal
according to the defendant's wishes.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 42-49, 103-08.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 126-36.
162. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
163. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984).
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